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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Court's jurisdiction is based on Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(b)(i), or, in
the alternative, Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the City Council have jurisdiction to consider the neighboring landowners'

appeal of the Draper City Planning Commission's decision?
The Court's determination of the jurisdiction of the City is analogous to a court's
determination under Rule 60(b), and is, therefore, reviewed to determine whether the trial
court abused it's discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989).
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 371-372.
2.

Did the Owners obtain a vested right to build on the upper portion of their lot?

The Court's determination of the existence of a vested right is a mixed question of
I
fact and law, and is therefore, reviewed for correctness, giving appropriate discretion to the
critical facts as found by the trial court. Scherbel v. Salt Lake City, Corp., 758 P.2d 897
(Utah 1988); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 366-370.
3.

Did the Court abuse it's discretion in denying the Owners' asserted claim of

equitable estoppel?
The Court's review of a trial court's decision on a claim of equitable estoppel is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State Dep't of Human Serv. ex rel Parker v.
Irrizarv. 893 P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1995).
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The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 366-370.
4.

Did the Court err in reviewing the Owners' claims for injunctive relief under

the standard established in Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001 (1992)?
This Court's interpretation of a statute is a matter of law and is, therefore, reviewed
for correctness. One Intern. (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993).
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 72-79.
5.

If the trial court did dismiss the Owners' claims for injunctive relief, was the

dismissal proper?
This Court's determination of a trial court's decision on a Motion to Dismiss is a
matter of law, and is, therefore, reviewed for correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers,
872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994).
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 72-79.
6.

Are the Owners' claims regarding the reasons for the City's decision barred by

the doctrine of res judicata?
The trial court's application of the doctrine of res judicata is a mixed question of fact
and law, and is, therefore, reviewed for correctness, giving appropriate discretion to the
critical facts as found by the trial court. Scherbel v. Salt Lake City, Corp., 758 P.2d 897
(Utah 1988); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
This defense was preserved for appeal at R. 365.
7.

Was the court's decision that the City's actions were not arbitrary, capricious,

or illegal correct?
This Court's review of a District Court's decision on a challenge to a municipality's

2

land use decision under Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001 (1992) is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard to the extent the trial court's decision is based on evidence presented to
the court, and is reviewed under a correctness standard to the extent the determination is
based on the record from the administrative proceedings of the municipality. Davis County
v. Clearfield Citv. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988).
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 372-376.
8.

Was the City's decision based on "public clamor?"

The trial court's determination of the basis for the City's decision is a finding of fact
and will be sustained if there is substantial evidence in the record from which the trial court
could have determined the facts as they did. In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah
1989).
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 372-376.
9.

Is the Owners' misrepresentation cured by a lack of bad faith?

The Court's determination of the effect of the Owners' misrepresentation is analogous
to a court's determination under Rule 60(b), and is, therefore, reviewed to determine whether
the trial court abused it's discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989).
The City's defense to this issue was preserved for appeal at R. 371-372.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Addendum to this Brief contains the full text of all determinative statutory and
constitutional provisions.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case originates from a request by the Appellants, Stephen Brendle and Richard
Maires, (hereinafter "the Owners"), to the Draper City Planning Commission for an
exception or modification to the Draper City Hillside Overlay Ordinance for the Owners' lot.
This request was made in June, 1994. The Planning Commission denied the requested
exception and the Owners appealed to the City Council, which also denied the exception in
August, 1994. A Petition for Review was then filed in the Third District Court, Case No.
940905958AA, the Honorable Anne Stirba. Judge Stirba determined that the decision of the
City was not arbitrary or capricious and upheld the City's issuance of a stop work order.
(See Addendum p.36-39). The Owners did not appeal that decision.
In April, 1995, the Owners requested that the Planning Commission reconsider it's
earlier denial of their request, based on a change in circumstances. The Planning
Commission agreed and on April 20, 1995, approved the Owner's request to grant an
exception to the terms of the Hillside Overlay Ordinance. An appeal of the Planning
Commission's decision was filed with the City more than 14 days after the Commission's
decision. On June 8, 1995 the Planning Commission reconsidered its April 20 decision, and
again granted approval of the Owners' request. An appeal was filed with the City Council
on June 9th, and on June 13, 1995, the City Council reversed the determination of the
Planning Commission and issued a stop work order on the Owners' project.
The Owners then filed suit in the Third District Court, the Honorable Leslie Lewis,
requesting review of the City's decision and also alleging several violations of State and
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federal law in a Complaint. The City filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the issues
were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case unless the action was brought under Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001 (1992). The
Court denied the City's Motion to Dismiss, but determined that the Owners' claims should be
reviewed under §10-9-1001, and that if necessary, the Court would hear additional evidence.
On review of the merits, the District Court upheld the City's determination.
This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In April, 1994, Stephen Brendle and Richard Maires, Plaintiffs, (hereinafter,

the Owners), executed an option agreement with a Developer to purchase Lot 304 (the Lot)
in the Cove at Bear Canyon subdivision. The Option made purchase of the Lot contingent
on the Owners obtaining approval to build on the upper portion of the Lot from Draper City.
(R. 249-251).
2.

Significant portions of the Lot are sloped in excess of 30% grade. (R. 267-

3.

Draper City Ordinance 9-15-040(a), (part of the City's Hillside Overlay

268).

Ordinance, set out in full in the Addendum to this brief), prohibits development on slopes in
excess of 30%, but allows the City Planning Commission discretion to modify this
requirement upon making specific findings relative to the project at issue. (See Addendum
p.13-15; R. 267).
4.

In April, 1994, the Owners applied for a building permit to construct a

residence on the upper portion of the Lot. A permit was mistakenly issued by the City
before the Owners received approval from the Planning Commission. (R. 259-261).
5

5.

In late April, 1994, the Owners started construction on the residence. (R.

6.

In June, 1994, Draper City issued a stop work order on the Owner's

270).

construction based upon the failure of the owners to obtain approval from the City Planning
Commission. (R. 270).
7.

On June 23, 1994, the Owners appeared before the Planning Commission and

contested the stop work order. (R. 271)
8.

The Planning Commission upheld the stop work order and denied the

requested approval to build on the upper portion of the Lot as proposed by the Owners. (R.
271).
9.

The Owners appealed the decision of the Planning Commission to the City

Council, which upheld the decision of the Planning Commission. (R. 271-272).
10.

The Owners filed a Petition for Review in the District Court and the District

Court, Case No. 940905958AA, after reviewing the petition on the merits, upheld the City's
decision, finding specifically that the Planning Commission and City Councils' actions were
not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. (R. 272; Addendum at p.36-39).
11.

In mid-April, 1995, the Owners requested that the Planning Commission

reconsider their petition to build on the upper portion of the Lot. In their request, the
Owners alleged that conditions had changed since the earlier petition, representing that now
there was no opposition from the neighboring landowners. (R. 274-278).
12.

On April 20, 1995, the Planning Commission approved the Owner's request to

build on the upper portion of the Lot. (R. 282-283).
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13.

On May 1, 1995, the Owners began foundation work on the home on the

upper portion of the Lot. (R. 287).
14.

In late May, 1995, more than fourteen days after the Planning Commission's

approval, a neighboring landowner appealed the decision of the Planning Commission to the
City Council. (R. 292, 337).
15.

On or near June 1, 1995, the Owners were informed by Paul Glauser, the

Draper City Community Development Director, that an appeal of the Planning Commission's
decision had been filed by a neighboring property owner. (R. 291-292).
16.

On June 8, 1995, the Planning Commission re-heard the Owners' petition and

granted permission to build on the upper portion of the Lot. That decision was appealed by
neighboring landowners to the City Council on June 9, 1995. (R. 293-294).
17.

With knowledge of a potential appeal to the City Council, the Owners

expended further funds and continued construction on the site. (R. 295-296, 301-302).
18.

The City Council held a hearing on the neighbor's appeal on June 13, 1995.

At that hearing, evidence was presented by neighbors in opposition to the Owner's petition,
contrary to the Owner's previous representations that there was no longer any objection from
neighboring landowners. (R. 296-297; Addendum p.30-35).
19.

The City Council overturned the decision of the Planning Commission, and

denied the petition of the Owners, approving the stop work order. (R. 298; Addendum p. 3035).
20.

The Owners appealed the decision of the City Council to the District Court.

21.

The District Court upheld the decision of the City Council, finding that the
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City had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, when the basis for the appeal was to correct
misinformation supplied by the Owners to the Planning Commission, and finding also that
the City's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. (R. 222-225).
22.

This appeal followed. (R. 226-227).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court's determination that the City had jurisdiction to consider the appeal of
the Planning Commission's decision was not an abuse of discretion. The rule establishing
the time for appeal is subject to equitable considerations, and the court's determination that
the Owners should not profit from their own misrepresentation was correct and prevents an
unjust and untenable result which would establish a poor precedent.
The trial court's determination that the Owners did not obtain a vested right was
legally correct. The law has long held that a party may not obtain vested rights based upon
the party's own misrepresentation. Accordingly, the Court's determination was correct.
The trial court's determination that the City was not estopped from issuing the stop
work order was not an abuse of discretion. A party who appears before the court seeking
equity must come with "clean hands." The court's factual determination that the Owners
misrepresented facts, whether the misrepresentation was in bad faith or not, provides a sound
basis for the trial court's decision.
The trial court's determination to review the Owners' claims under Utah Code
Annotated §10-9-1001 was correct and the court's review considered the Owners' claims for
injunctive relief under that standard. The record clearly establishes that the court did not
dismiss the Owners' claims, but considered whether or not the City's actions were illegal, as
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well as whether or not they were arbitrary or capricious.
If the trial court did dismiss the Owners' injunctive relief claims, the dismissal was
proper. The court's determination that the Owners did not have a vested right to build on
the upper portion of the Lot compels the conclusion that the claims for injunctive relief,
which are founded on the allegation of a vested right, fail to state a claim. The takings
claims are based on regulation of the use of the property, not on an actual physical invasion.
Therefore, to establish a taking which violates constitutional principles, the Owners must
demonstrate a complete destruction of their property. They have not, and cannot make such
an allegation. Also, the Owners have no real investment-backed expectation concerning the
property, because they made their purchase contingent on the ability to gain approval to build
on the upper portion of the Lot.
Any of the Owners' allegations which concern the City's basis for decision are barred
by the doctrine of res judicata. The Owners challenged the City's basis for denying their
requested exception in a prior action in the Third District Court, the Honorable Anne Stirba.
Judge Stirba upheld the decision of the City and that decision was never appealed. In the
case at bar, the City Council's reason for denying the requested exception was the same as
the reason which the District Court found in the prior action to be sufficient and not
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Therefore, because the same claim was already raised and
litigated, relitigation of the issues is barred by res judicata principles.
Assuming, arguendo, the City's basis for decision can be challenged in this action,
the decision was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. The City determined that it would not
grant the requested modification out of a desire to remain consistent with the stated purpose
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of the Hillside Overlay Ordinance. Such a decision is clearly not arbitrary or capricious.
Additionally, even if the City did consider the objections of the neighboring landowners,
those objections were proper because they indicated that significant harm, in the form of
instability of property values, could result from allowing the requested exception. Therefore,
the City's decision was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. These same reasons clearly
demonstrate that the City's decision was not based on "public clamor," as alleged by the
Owners, but on sound policy considerations, which are entitled to deference in this Court.
Finally, the Court's determination that the Owners' apparent lack of bad faith did not
preclude the City from hearing the appeal is not an abuse of discretion. The decision is
clearly supported by strong equitable considerations, and is in accord with good public
policy. A party should not be allowed to benefit from their misrepresentation to the
detriment of the public, and the Council's determination of what is detrimental to the public
should be accorded deference.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE CITY HAD JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE NEIGHBOR'S APPEAL OF
THE PLANNING COMMISSION'S DECISION
While Draper City Ordinance 9-6-050, (Addendum p. 11-12), provides that appeals
from determinations of the Planning Commission should be filed with the City Council
within 14 days of the Commission's decision, such a time limitation is not jurisdictional, but
is subject to considerations of equity. Dumais v. Somersworth, 134 A.2d 700 (N.H. 1957);
10

Borough of Malvern v. K.R.I. Corp., 570 A.2d 633 (P.A. 1990) (two-year statute of
limitations on seeking refund from municipality held subject to equitable considerations).
In Dumais, a building inspector for the City of Somersworth had issued a building
permit to Dumais to construct a garage on his premises. When construction was
substantially completed, nearly a month after the permit was issued, an appeal was filed by a
neighbor. A Board rule required that any appeal be filed within ten days. In proceedings
before the Board of Adjustment, it was determined that the garage was in violation of the
City's zoning ordinance, and Dumais' permit was revoked.
Dumais argued that the Board was precluded from revoking his permit because the
appeal was not filed within the requisite ten day period. The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire rejected Dumais' appeal. The Court noted that an objecting party could not be
bound by a lack of notice and confirmed the Board's earlier finding that the appeal had been
received within a reasonable time, as soon as the appealing party had notice of the granting
of the permit.
The facts of the case presently before this Court are strikingly similar to those in
Dumais, and the sound reasoning of the New Hampshire Supreme Court should be applied.
To deny the City jurisdiction to proceed in this case, would allow the Owners to obtain their
desired result, in contravention of clearly stated City policy, by misrepresentation. The
Owners were allowed to go before the Commission a second time only because they
represented their was no longer opposition to their project. (R. 274-278). The appeal must
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be allowed to correct the misrepresentations of the Owners1.
Were the Court to hold otherwise, an untenable precedent would be established. The
ordinance clearly contemplates that any party seeking an exception to its terms bear the
burden of establishing the necessary facts before the Commission, and the Council if necessary. To place the burden of verifying statements of fact presented to the City by a party
seeking a modification of the ordinance is contrary to the ordinance's clear intent. It also
would place an unworkable burden on the City. The Ordinance was adopted in a time of
unprecedented growth and the strains that the growth-associated development have placed on
City resources are tremendous. (R. 107-108). The Hillside Overlay Ordinance is one means
of controlling some of that growth in a manner consistent with concerns for public safety, the
environment and aesthetics. To require the City to establish the facts for an applicant's
exception is too great a burden to bear. Additionally, denying the City the ability to correct
the misrepresentation will lead to the inequitable situation wherein a right to proceed in
violation of stated City policy is gained by alleging facts which are, at worst, untrue, and at
best, unsubstantiated. Such a result is clearly not good policy and should be avoided.
II.
THE OWNERS DID NOT OBTAIN ANY VESTED RIGHT
It is widely held that a permit issued upon misrepresentation is not valid and the party
with such a permit has no vested right. P.P. Corp. v. Lewis, 373 So.2d 929 (Fla. App.
1979); Westchester County Soc'v for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Mengel, 36

1

The policy behind the Dumais decision has also been adopted by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and their Federal counterpart in Rule 60(b) which allows a Court to do equity by relieving a party of the unjust
effects of a judgment based on misrepresentation or mistake. It is clear that the law does not favor a circumstance
which would allow a party to profit from their own misrepresentation.
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NYS2d 531 (1972); McQuillan Mun. Corp. §26.217 (3rd Ed. 1986); 13 Am. Jur. 2d
Buildings §11 (1964). Based on the clear findings of the District Court, the Owners'
misrepresentation bars any claim that they possessed a vested right to proceed.
In P.P. Corp. the court considered whether or not the City could revoke a building
permit that had already been issued, and construction on the building had started. The court
held that the revocation of a building permit is justified when the submitted plans contain a
material misrepresentation. The court further found that it made no difference whether the
submitting party knew of the misrepresentation or not.
The Owners' citation to Western Land Equities v. Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980)
is not contrary authority to the above-stated proposition. In Western Land, the Court held
"that an applicant for subdivision approval of a building permit is entitled to favorable action
if the application conforms to the zoning ordinance in effect at the time of the application...
" IcL at 391. The Court had no reason to, and did not address the circumstance where a
permit is granted based upon misrepresentation. It is difficult to imagine that the Court
would have allowed the applicants in Western Land to proceed had their application
misrepresented facts which, if properly stated, would have been in conflict with the thenapplicable zoning regulations. Such is the case presently before this Court and, accordingly,
Western Land is not authority for the proposition that a party who misrepresents facts,
whether in bad faith or not, can profit to the extent of gaining "vested rights.2"

2

The Owners stress in their brief the tremendous expense incurred in the building of their home
in an apparent effort to convince this Court that the "equities" are in their favor. It should be noted that initially,
work was started before the Owners ever applied for approval from the City Planning Commission. (R. 270).
Then, on two separate occasions, the Owners incurred further expense by continuing work pending an appeal they
had knowledge of. (R. 289, 291-293, 301-302). Finally, it should be noted that when the Owners purchased the
Lot, they purchased with full understanding that the City had not approved building on the upper portion of the Lot.
13

From the foregoing it is clear that, based upon the Owners' misrepresentations to the
City, they could not and did not obtain any vested right to build their home in violation of
the Hillside Ordinance.
III.
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE OWNERS'
CLAIM OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
A trial court's ruling on the question of equitable estoppel is reviewed under an
"abuse of discretion" standard. State Dep't of Human Serv. ex rel Parker v. Irrizarv, 893
P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1995). In this case, it is clear that the trial court did not abuse it's
discretion in refusing to apply equitable estoppel against the City.
It is a well settled doctrine of equity that a party who seeks equity from the court
must appear before the court with clean hands. Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454
(Utah 1982); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976). In the trial court's ruling on
the merits of the petition for review, the court found:
Petitioner's (sic) were not entitled to rely upon the decision of
the Planning Commission in lifting the stop work order when
the decision was based upon erroneous information which was at
least in part supplied to the City from Petitioners' (sic) and
which was erroneous information not checked for accuracy by
Petitioners' (sic).
(R. 225, 16).
The Court's determination that the City was not equitably estopped was clearly based
on it's factual finding that the Owners supplied the City with incorrect information, which
the Owners made no effort to substantiate, and that information was the basis for the
(R. 249-251). From the foregoing, its seems apparent that the Owners have not acted innocently, and that the
supposed "equities" do not actually favor their position.
14

Planning Commission's change in decision. The court implicitly determined, from the facts
presented at the hearing on the Owners' Petition for Review, that it would be inequitable to
allow the Owners to supply bad information, and then gain advantage over the City on the
basis of that information. The Court's determination is clearly supported by the evidence,
(See R. 223, 224), and was not an abuse of discretion.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DISMISS THE OWNERS' CLAIMS FOR
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, BUT DECIDED THEM ON THE MERITS
In their Brief, the Owners argue that the trial court's ruling on the City's Motion to
Dismiss "precluded [the Owners] from pursuing state and federal constitutional claims set
forth in their verified Complaint or from obtaining declaratory relief or injunctive relief
under Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1 et seq

" (Brief of Appellants at p.25). The record

does not support the Owners' assertion that they were precluded from pursuing those claims.
The City's Motion to Dismiss asserted that the Owners' action should have been filed
as a Petition for Review under Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001 (1992), and that the claims
presented in Counts II, IV, V and VI of the Complaint should be dismissed. (R. 74-77).
Section 10-9-1001(3) requires that on a Petition for Review of a City's land use decision:
[T]he Court shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.
(emphasis added).

The Court denied the City's motion, but determined that the claim should be treated
as a petition for review, and that "taking of additional evidence may, therefore, be
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required... ." (R. at 212). By denying the City's Motion to Dismiss counts II, IV, V and
VI of the Complaint, and determining that the Complaint should be treated as a Petition for
Review under §10-9-1001, the trial court did not dismiss the Owners' claims, but determined
that they should be reviewed to determine whether or not the City's actions were illegal.
The Owners cite to no evidence to support their assertion that they were precluded
from pursuing their claims, and the record does not support their assertion. To the contrary,
the court specifically allowed for the presentation of additional evidence if required. (R.
211-216).
The pleadings filed by the Owners also indicate that the Court did not preclude them
from pursuing their asserted claims. In the Owners' response to the City's Motion to
Dismiss, they asserted that Section 10-9-1001 did not preclude consideration of the issues
raised by their claims, arguing that a determination of whether the City's actions were illegal
necessarily included a determination of all the issues raised in the Complaint. (R. 84-85).
The record further demonstrates that the Court decided the issues raised in Counts II
through VI of the Complaint on the merits. The Owners specifically asserted that "Counts II
through VI of the Complaint allege that Plaintiffs acquired a vested property right in the
development of their property by virtue of their reasonable reliance on the final decision
rendered by the Planning Commission... ." (R. 85). The Court found that the Owners had
acquired no vested rights. (R. 225, f3). In consideration of the Owners' assertion that
Counts II through VI were based on the allegation of a vested right, the court's conclusion
that the Owners obtained no vested rights requires a finding that the Owners' claims fail on
the merits.

IS

The record is clear that the claims presented in Counts II through VI of the Complaint
were not dismissed, but the trial court determined whether or not the claimed illegality
existed, and made a determination on the merits that the City's actions were not illegal. That
decision should not be overturned.

V.
IF THE TRIAL COURT DID DISMISS THE OWNERS' CLAIMS FOR INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF, THE DISMISSAL IS SUPPORTED BY SOUND REASONS, AND IS,
THEREFORE, NOT ERROR
While the record does not support the Owners' assertion that claims II, IV, V and VI
of their Complaint were dismissed, assuming, arguendo, it is true, the trial court's decision
to dismiss the Owners' claims for injunctive relief was correct. All the claims for injunctive
relief rest on the allegation that the Owners obtained a vested right to build on the upper
portion of the Lot. The Court's determination that they obtained no vested right was proper,
as demonstrated in Section II, infra. Because the court found that the facts alleged to support
the claim were not present, its determination that the claims fail is correct. Additionally, the
Court's review of the case was limited by the statutory standard of review, and the takings
claims were premature. Some of the claims are barred by the Owners' failure to comply
with the Governmental Immunity Act, and finally, the takings claims are manifestly without
merit.
A.

SECTION 10-9-1001 LIMITS THE COURT'S REVIEW TO WHETHER THE
CITY'S ACTIONS WERE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL
As noted above, Section IV, infra, Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001 (1992) dictates
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the standard of review for administrative appeals from a municipality's land use decision.
The plain language of this statute requires a court to determine if the actions of the
municipality were illegal. It specifically provides a remedy for relief from a municipality's
judgment. Because the Owners have an adequate remedy at law in Section 10-9-1001, any
claim for extraordinary relief such as injunctive relief is improper. Counts II through VI of
the Complaint seek injunctive relief, and, therefore, if the trial court's decision did dismiss
the Owners' claims, the decision was not error.
B.

THE OWNERS' TAKINGS CLAIMS WERE PREMATURE
In Williamson County Planning Com'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the

Supreme Court held that until an administrative decision regarding the development of
property was final, and alleged damages were made certain by determining what development
would be allowed, the court has no final decision to review. In the case at bar, until the
District Court completed it's Administrative Review, and the Owners have obtained a
decision as to what development would be allowed on the Lot, no final question for review
was presented. Under the law of Williamson County, the Owners' takings claims are
premature until a final decision is made regarding what development will be allowed on the
property. *
C.

THE OWNERS' CLAIMS FOR RELIEF UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
AND UTAH LAW ARE BARRED BY THEIR FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF
CLAIM AS REQUIRED BY THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Owners' claims based on the State Constitution and

state law are not barred by their failure to complete the administrative process prior to filing,
(see infra, above), the claims are barred by the Owners' failure to file a Notice of Claim.
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The Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires:
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental
entity, ... shall file a written notice of claim with the entity
before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
Utah Code Annotated §63-30-11(2) (1991).
This requirement is strictly construed by Utah Courts. State v. Bellonio, 911 P.2d
1294 (Utah App. 1996). In Bellonio, the Plaintiffs was injured at the Salt Lake City
Airport. His attorney had served a notice of claim on the State Attorney General, the City
Attorney, the Airport Director and counsel for the Airport's insurance carrier. The Court
held that, although the City and the Airport clearly had notice of the intent to bring suit well
within the required time period, and despite the fact that actual notice was received, the
Plaintiff's failure to strictly comply with the terms of the Governmental Immunity Act was
fatal to his claim.
In the case at bar, there is no allegation that a notice of claim was ever filed.
Therefore, the Owners' failure to comply with the terms of the Governmental Immunity Act
is fatal to their state law-based claims.
D.

THE OWNERS' TAKINGS CLAIMS WERE WITHOUT MERIT AND DISMISSAL
WAS, THEREFORE, PROPER.
Utah law holds that when the character of the interference alleged results from

regulation of the uses of property, to amount to a taking the regulation must rise to the level
of complete destruction, confiscation, or deprivation. Colman v. State Land Board, 795
P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Bountiful v. DeLuca. 292 P.2d 194 (Utah 1930). The Owners
contend, citing Colman, that the City's application of the Hillside Ordinance amounts to a
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taking because it has materially lessened the value of their property. This claim
misapprehends the law.
In Colman, the State Supreme Court held that a factual question existed as to whether
or not the Plaintiffs property had been taken or damaged, in violation of the State
Constitution. The Plaintiff in that case had alleged complete destruction of his property, in
that he claimed the State's actions prevented him from using the canal for the express
purpose for which it was constructed. Based upon the allegation of complete destruction, the
Court remanded the case to determine whether, in fact, a taking had occurred. In
distinguishing the argument presented by the State, the Court stated:
[T]he emphasis the State places on the police powers is often
made when there is a close issue that turns on the difference
between a taking or damage under article I, section 22 and mere
regulation of property and activities on property. Many statutes
and ordinances regulate what a property owner can do with and
on the owner's property. Those regulations may have a
significant impact on the utility or value of property, yet they
generally do not require compensation under article I section 22.
Only when governmental action rises to the level of a taking or
damage under article I, section 22 is the State required to pay
compensation.
Colman at 627.
This view was earlier expressed by our State Supreme Court:
that the exercise of proper police regulations may to some extent
prevent enjoyment of individual rights in property or cause
inconvenience or loss to the owner, does not necessarily render
the police law unconstitutional, for the reason that such laws are
not considered as appropriating private property for a public
use, but simply as regulating its use and enjoyment, and if the
owner through a lawful exercise of the power suffers
inconvenience, injury, or a loss, it is regarded as damnum
absque injuria, provided always, that constitutional mandates
have not been invaded by a confiscation, destruction, or
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deprivation of property... .
DeLuca, 292 P.2d 194 (Utah 1930).
From the foregoing citations, it is clear that when the character of the interference is
regulation of the uses of property, to amount to a taking, it must rise to the level of complete
destruction, confiscation, or deprivation. In the case at bar, the Owners have made no
allegation of complete destruction, and, in fact, cannot do so. The Lot in question is still
buildable in the lower portion, as originally approved3. That the value of the Lot may be
greater with a home in the upper portion is undisputed, but that fact does not turn the
application of the ordinance into a "taking" of property. The Owners here have made no
such allegations, nor could they. Accordingly, the allegation of a taking fails to state a claim
and the decision of the trial court was proper.
It is equally clear that the Owners' allegations of a taking under the Federal
Constitution are insufficient to state a claim. In Perm Central Transportation Co. v. New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978), the Supreme Court clearly held that a claim that
a regulation prohibits an economically beneficial use and diminishes the value of property is
not sufficient to state a claim for a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, but that the
regulation must operate to deny practically all beneficial use of the property at issue.
Additionally, in assessing claims of regulatory takings, the Supreme Court has
considered "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations... ." Perm Central at 124. In the present case, the Owners have no reasonable

It is not disputed by the City that building on the lower portion will entail certain expenses that
the Owners may not have incurred in the upper portion of the Lot, but the Lot is still capable of supporting a
residence on the lower portion.
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investment-backed expectations. The Hillside Overlay Ordinance was enacted before Owners
acquired their Option, and, in fact, preceded the subdivision plat. The Owners Option was
expressly contingent on gaining approval to build on the upper portion. Because the taking
allegation rests on an event which was, at best, a contingency, the Owners cannot claim an
"expectation" in the value of the property.
Because the Owners here have not alleged, and cannot allege, a deprivation of all
beneficial use of their property, and because there is no "expectation" which was destroyed,
their Federal takings claim fails also.
The Owners' allegations under 42 U.S.C. §1983 are similarly flawed. These claims
are, by the Owners' assertion, founded upon the factual allegation that the Owners had a
vested right to build on the upper portion of the lot. As noted above, the trial court's
decision that the Owners had no vested right was supported by substantial evidence and was
clearly not an abuse of discretion. Because the Owners obtained no vested rights, their
§1983 claim also fails.
Finally, the Owners have argued that the Court committed error by dismissing their
claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act. If the Court did, in fact, dismiss their claims
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, it made no difference whatsoever in the outcome of
their Petition on the merits, and was harmless error. Review under the Declaratory
Judgment Act and review under U.C.A. §10-9-1001 produce the same results. Under either
section, the trial court's function in this case would have been to determine whether or not
the City's actions were illegal. Further, the trial court's legal and factual determinations are
reviewed in the same manner in this Court. The trial court heard evidence and determined
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whether or not the City acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or illegally. The Owners would have
had no greater rights under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Owners' argument presents a
distinction without difference, therefore, even if the Court's determination on the Motion to
Dismiss was error, such error was harmless. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694
(Utah App. 1994).
VI.
THE OWNERS' CLAIMS REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE CITY COUNCIL
ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
In Section V of their opening Appellate Brief, the Owners argue that the decision of
the Council was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. In Section VI they argue that the Council's
decision was based on public clamor, and was, therefore, improper. The trial court
determined that each of these claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and the
court's determination was correct.
In the prior District Court action before Judge Stirba, the court determined that the
decision of the Planning Commission and City Council was not arbitrary and capricious.
(See Addendum p. 36-39). That judgment was never appealed and stands as a valid
judgment. In Schaer v. State ex rel. UDOT. 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme
Court set forth the elements of res judicata. In Schaer, the court stated:
In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or
their privies and also the same cause of action; and this precludes the
relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well as those that
were in fact litigated in the prior action."

Id. at 1340 (quoting Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978)).
It is clear that the Owner's petition for review of the City's actions was fully litigated
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in the first District Court action between the parties, and is therefore, barred in the present
action.
While it is not clear that the Owners' "public clamor" allegation was presented in the
prior case, it is clear that the claim is barred in this action by res judicata principles. In
their opening appellate brief, the Owners argue that "the only real basis for Draper City
Council's reversal of the decision to allow Owners to proceed with the construction on the
east end of their lot was the objection of neighboring landowners who were concerned about
possible impact on the views from their lots... ." (Brief of Appellant at p. 32, 33). The
same concerns were presented by the Owners in their original Petition for Review before
Judge Stirba. In their Memorandum in Support of their Petition for Review in the prior
case, the Owners allege "the City Council's decision was not made on the merits, but was
based on an improper factor not provided for in the Hillside Zoning Ordinance-the
neighbors' concerns about possibly obstructed views." (Addendum p.40, 51). While the
Owners did not argue specifically the alleged impropriety of basing a decision on "public
clamor," they clearly presented the same factual basis for an argument that the City's
decision was arbitrary and capricious. Whether this Court finds that the same claim was
presented, or that the same claim could have been, and should have been presented, the
present claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
VII.
THE COURT'S DECISION THAT THE CITY'S ACTIONS WERE NOT
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL WAS CORRECT
Even if the Court finds that the Owners claims regarding the propriety of the City's
decision are not barred by res judicata, the District Court was correct in finding that the
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City's actions were not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Section 10-9-1001(3)(b), Utah Code
Annotated, requires that on appeal from a municipality's land use decision, a district court is
to "determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal."

In this

case, the reasons for the City Council's decision are clearly demonstrated in the record, and
are patently not arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
In the recorded minutes from the City Council meeting of August 23, 1994,
(Addendum p. 16, 19), paragraph 8.6 reads as follows:
Paul Lunt made a motion to deny the waiver of the Hillside
Ordinance and stated that Mr. Brendle will have to build where
proposed when he bought the lot. The reason is that this would
be setting a precedence (sic) and if we go against the Hillside
Ordinance we will have a lot of problems. The motion was
seconded by Randy Gainer, noting that his reason was because
Gordon Haight's letter stated "however this concurrence does
not waive any subdivision covenants, city ordinances, city
building code or other requirements that may be applicable." A
roll call vote unanimously approved the motion.
From the foregoing it is clear that the Council's reason for denying the Owner's
request on the first appeal to the Council was a desire to remain consistent with the stated
policy of preventing building on 30% slopes. Such a desire is obviously rational and legally
justified in view of the City's remarkable growth and the potential for similar requests in the
future.
The minutes from the second appeal proceeding before the City Council reflect that
the Council's decision in that proceeding was based on the same rationale as the first. The
minutes from the Council's June 13, 1995 meeting, (Addendum p.30, 34), at paragraph
15.14 read:
Councilman Gainer made a motion to reverse the decision of the
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Planning Commission to allow modification of the Hillside
Ordinance because there is no new evidence from a year ago.
The Council clearly determined that absent some change in circumstances, their prior
decision still represented the determination of the Council. There is nothing arbitrary or
capricious about a City's desire to stay consistent with the stated policy of a newly-adopted
ordinance.
Even if the Council were primarily concerned with the objections of the neighboring
landowners, such a concern is a sufficient basis to deny the Owners their requested
exception. The Hillside Overlay Ordinance provides that the Commission may allow an
exception to the Ordinance, if it does not result in "significant harm." The Council
determined that action that would promote the instability of property values in a new
development is "significant harm."

That determination is entitled to deference. Xanthos v.

Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1984).
The trial court's decision that the City was not arbitrary or capricious in their
determination was correct and should be affirmed.
VIII.
THE CITY'S DECISION WAS NOT BASED ON "PUBLIC CLAMOR"
From the facts demonstrated in Section VII, infra, it is clear that the City's decision
was based upon concerns other than simply the "public clamor" alleged by the Owners. The
City's desire to remain true to the stated policy of avoiding development in area in excess of
30% slope is, standing alone, sufficient reason to sustain the determination reached by the
Council. However, if the Council was concerned with promoting stability of property values
in the area, such consideration was legally appropriate.
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IX.
THE OWNERS' MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT CURED BY THEIR LACK OF
BAD FAITH
In Section VII of their Brief on Appeal, the Owners argue that their lack of bad faith
leads to the legal conclusion that they should be allowed to proceed with building on the
upper portion of their lot. In support of this assertion, they cite two cases: Commonwealth
v. Flynn, 344 A.2d 720 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975); and Aranosian Oil Co. v. City of
Portsmouth, 612 A.2d 357 (N.H. 1992). Both of these cases are inapposite to the situation
before this Court. In neither of the cited cases did the applicant for a building permit
misrepresent facts when they had the burden of proving facts to justify an exception.
The Owners have cast their argument in terms of an apparent lack of bad faith to
avoid the clear import of their own failure to verify facts they represented to be true. The
above-cited cases are not contrary authority to that presented in Section II above. Based
upon the Owners' misrepresentation, the trial court found that the Council had jurisdiction to
correct the error caused by the Owners. Such a clearly equitable decision was not an abuse
of discretion, and should not be overturned by this Court.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the City respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the decision of the Third District Court.
DATED this /$//

day of November, 1996.

Attorney for Appefllee City of Draper
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Annotated §78-33-1 et. seq.

I

JUDICIAL CODE

509

has the burden of proving inability to comply with the child
support order.
(3) (a) Ifa court finds that an obligor is in contempt of court
for failure to comply with a child support order, the court
may, in addition to other available sanctions, suspend the
driver's license of the obligor and impose conditions for
reinstatement.
(b) If a court finds that a custodial parent is in contempt of court for failure to comply with a child visitation
order, the court may, in addition to other available sanctions, suspend the driver's license of the custodial parent
and impose conditions for reinstatement.
1996
CHAPTER 33
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

Section
78-33-1.
78-33-2.
78-33-3.
78-33-4.
78-33-5.
78-33-6.
78-33-7.
78-33-8.
78-33-9.
78-33-10.
78-33-11.
78-33-12.
78-33-13.

Jurisdiction of district courts — Form — Effect.
Rights, status, legal relations under instruments
or statutes may be determined.
Contracts.
Suit by fiduciary or representative.
Court's general powers.
Discretion to deny declaratory relief.
Appeals and reviews.
Supplemental relief.
Trial of issues of fact.
Costs.
Parties.
Chapter to be liberally construed.
"Person" defined.

78-33-1.

J u r i s d i c t i o n of district c o u r t s — F o r m — Effect.
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall
have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations,
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground t h a t a
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration
may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree.
1953
78-33-2.

R i g h t s , status, legal relations u n d e r instrum e n t s or s t a t u t e s may be d e t e r m i n e d .
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract,
or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by
a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may
have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other
legal relations thereunder.
1953
78-33-3. Contracts.
A contract may be construed either before or after there has
been a breach thereof.
1953
78-33-4. Suit by fiduciary or r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee,
legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent, an infant,
lunatic or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal
relations in respect thereto:
(1) to ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; or,
(2) to direct the executors, administrators or trustees
to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their
fiduciary capacity; or,

78-33-13

(3) to determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of
construction of wills and other writings.
1953
78-33-5. Court's general powers.
The enumeration in Sections 78-33-2, 78-33-3 and 78-33-4
does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers
conferred in Section 78-33-1 in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will
terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.
1953
78-33-6. D i s c r e t i o n to d e n y declaratory relief.
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory
judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceeding.
1953
78-33-7. Appeals and r e v i e w s .
All orders, judgments and decrees under this chapter may
be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees.
1953
78-33-8. S u p p l e m e n t a l relief.
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree
may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction
to grant the relief. If the application is deemed sufficient, the
court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party,
whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be
granted forthwith.
1953
78-33-9. Trial of issues of fact.
When a proceeding under this chapter involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and
determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and
determined in other civil actions in the court in which the
proceeding is pending.
1953
78-33-10. Costs.
In any proceeding under this chapter the court may make
such award of costs as may seem equitable and just.
1953
78-33-11. Parties.
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made
parties who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice
the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any
proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal or
county ordinance or franchise such municipality or county
shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if
a statute or state franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid
the attorney general shall be served with a copy of the
proceeding and be entitled to be heard.
1953
78-33-12. Chapter to b e l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d .
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose
settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity
respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is
liberally construed and administered.

is to
with
to be
1953

78-33-13. "Person" defined.
The word "person" wherever used in this chapter, shall be
construed to mean any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated association or society, or municipal or
other corporation of any character whatsoever.
1953
C H A P T E R 34
E M I N E N T DOMAIN
Section
78-34-1.
78-34-2.

SL

Uses for which right may be exercised.
Estates and rights that may be taken.

Utah Code Annotated §10-9-1001

3

MUNICIPAL LAND USE

10-9-1002

with respect to property boundary lines, and other permissible forms of land
use controls.
(2) The legislative body may refuse to approve or renew any plat or
subdivision plan, or dedication of any street or other ground, if the deed
restrictions, covenants, or similar binding agreements running with the land
for the lots or parcels covered by the plat or subdivision prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting reasonably sited and designed solar collectors, clotheslines, or other energy devices based on renewable resources from being
installed on buildings erected on lots or parcels covered by the plat or
subdivision.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-901, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 62.

PART 10
APPEALS AND ENFORCEMENT
10-9-1001. Appeals.
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative
remedies.
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered.
(3) The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.
History: C. 1953,10-9-1001, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 53; 1992, ch. 30, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-

ment, effective April 27, 1992, made grammatical changes in Subsection (1).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and
Planning § 1019 et seq.

10-9-1002.

C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 265 et seq.

Enforcement,

(1) (a) A municipality or any owner of real estate within the municipality in
which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority
of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other
remedies provided by law, institute:
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate
actions; or
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful
building, use, or act.
(b) A municipality need only establish the violation to obtain the
injunction.
555

+

Utah Code Annotated §63-30-11

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

63-30-11

Subsection (1) and inserted "Eminent Domain"
and made a related punctuation change in Subsection (2).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v.
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 166.

63-30-10.6.

Attorneys' fees for records requests.

(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for recovery
of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802.
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11:
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be
filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 63-2404; and
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply.
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought contemporaneously with the
claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action.
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.6, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 259, § 50; 1992, ch. 280, § 56.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, added the reference to § 63-2-405 in Subsection (1).

63-30-11.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 280,
§ 63 makes L. 1991, ch. 259 effective July 1,
1992.

Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service
— Legal disability.

( D A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the
claim were against a private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall
file a wiitten notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are
known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent,
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
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(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of
claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court
may extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the
merits.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch.
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4;
1991, ch. 76, $ 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added the sub-

section designations in Subsection (3)(b) and
made related changes and deleted "or imprisoned" after "legal guardian" and made related
changes in Subsection (4)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
is to require every claimant to state clearly all
of the elements of his claims to the board of
commissioners or city council for allowance as
a condition precedent to his right to sue the
city and recover his damages in an ordinary
action. Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306,
134 P. 1167 (1913).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Assignment of municipal debt.
Clear statement of claims required.
Conditions for right to recover.
Damages not specified.
Failure to file claim.
Notice.
Sufficiency of notice.
— Nature of claim asserted.
Waiver of objections by city.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Functions of the notice of claim requirement
in giving the affected governmental entity an
opportunity to promptly investigate and remedy defects immediately, in avoiding unnecessary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties
which might attend changes in administration
provide sufficient justification for its imposition as to governmental but not other tort-feasors, and therefore this section does not deny
equal protection. Sears v. Southworth, 563
P.2d 192 (Utah 1977).
Assignment of municipal debt.
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes
assignor to assignee is not kind of claim required to be submitted to city in accordance
with this statute. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d
40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968) (decided under former
law).
Clear statement of claims required.
The purpose of notice-of-claim requirement

Conditions for right to recover.
Statutory right to recover is available only
upon compliance with the condiiions upon
which right is conferred. One who seeks to enforce the right must by allegation and proof
bring himself within the conditions prescribed
thereby. Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah
362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940).
D a m a g e s not specified.
A claim that stated the time, place and general nature of the injury and the sidewalk defect causing it fulfilled the purpose of former
section even though the amount of damages
was not stated; since the claim had to be filed
within thirty days of the injury, the exact
amount of damages was impossible to ascertain. Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d
362, 412 P.2d 449 (1966) (decided under former
law).
Failure to file claim.
Because no claim was filed as required by
this section, action to recover moneys expended
to construct bridge which city had agreed to
construct was barred. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d
405 (1934).
Exceptional circumstances were not present

200

1

Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3

B

78-2a-2

JUDICIAL CODE

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing
fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial
Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of
the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per
annum or fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sentence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-

ficeof a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years
and until a successor is appointed and approved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the
present third and fourth sentences and made
minor stylistic changes,

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
14
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(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(0 appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1988 amendment by ch. 73, effective April 25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) and (b) in
Subsection (1); inserted "resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a);
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); deleted
"notwithstanding any other provision of law"
at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsections (2Kb)
to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); added
"except those from the small claims department of a circuit court" at the end of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic changes.
The 1988 amendment by ch. 210, effective
April 25, 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i).
The 1988 amendment by ch. 248, effective
April 25, 1988, in Subsection (2)(a), rewrote
the phrase before "except" which had read "the

final orders and decrees of state and local agencies or appeals from the district court review of
them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other
provision of law" at the end of Subsection
(2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2Kb); designated former Subsections (2Kb) to (2)(h) as
Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and substituted
"first degree or capital felony" for "first or capital degree felony" in present Subsection (2)(f).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 80, effective
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g),
which read "appeals from orders on petitions
for extraordinary writs involving a criminal
conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony" and made punctuation
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 224, effective
April 23, 1990, inserted the subdivision designation (i) in Subsection (2Kb) and added Subsection (2)(b)(ii), and made related stylistic
changes.
The 1991 amendment, effective J a n u a r y 1,
1992, substituted "a court of record" for "district court" in Subsection (2)(f).
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15,
39-6-16.

15

10

Draper City Ordinance 9-6-050

H

(a) Prepare and recommend a general plan, street plan,
zoning map, zoning ordinances, and any other relevant
proposals or recommendations to the City Council for the
proper development of the City;
(b) Prepare and recommend any additions, changes, or
amendments to the City's general plan, street plan, zoning
map, zoning ordinances or other relevant items to the City
Council for the proper development of the City;
(c)

Administer the provisions of the zoning ordinances;

(d) Recommend subdivision ordinances and regulations and
amendments thereto to the City Council;
(e) Recommend approval or denial of subdivision
applications;
(f) Advise the City Council on matters requested by the
City Council;
(g) Hear or decide any matter that the City Council
designates, including the approval or denial of, or
recommendations to approve or deny, conditional use permits;
(h) Prepare and recommend programs for public improvements
and the financing thereof to the City Council; and
(i) Exercise any other powers that are necessary to enable
the Planning Commission to perform its function or that are
delegated to it by the City Council.
9-6-040 Examinations and Surveys.
The Planning Commission and its authorized agents may enter
upon any land at reasonable times to make examinations and
surveys as necessary to enable it to perform its function to
promote City planning and development.
9-6-050 Appeals from the Commission.
Any interested person aggrieved of a final decision of the
Planning Commission may appeal that decision by filing a written
appeal stating the grounds therefor within fourteen (14) days
from the date of the decision or action to the City's Board of
Adjustment, provided that certain zoning matters including
conditional use permits and subdivisions shall be appealed to the
City Council as designated by the City.

9-6
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Draper City Ordinance 9-15-040
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9-15-030

"Rational
Method,"
"SCS
Curve
Number
Method,"
or
appropriate equivalent. Data provided should include:
(A)

Rainfall depth, duration and distribution;

(B)

Watershed slope and drainage area delineation;

(C)

Land condition of watershed surface;

(D)

Topography of drainage area;

(E) Description of soil conditions of watershed.
Erosion calculations shall employ predictions of soil
loss sheet erosion using the Universal Soil Loss Equation
or appropriate equivalent.
Data to be provided should
include factors of:
(F)

Rainfall intensity and duration;

(G)

Soil erodibility;

(H)

Land slope and length of slope or topography;

(I) Condition of the soil surface and land management
practices in use;
(J)
etc.

Surface cover, grass, woodland, crops, pavements,

(d) Final Approval: Final approval will require satisfactory
compliance with all of the requirements of the preliminary
review, and compliance with all of the Draper City requirements
for final plat approval as outlined in the City's Ordinances.
9-15-040

Development Requirements

(a) Development in General. Slope areas in excess of 30% may
not be developed, and no more than thirty percent (30%) of a
development's slope areas in excess of 30% may be included in
the area calculation to determine density.
The Planning
Commission may modify this requirement upon finding that:
(1)

No significant harm will result; and

(2) The proposed modification
functional and improved plan; and

will

result

in

a

more

(3) The developer/builder agrees to comply with any
conditions or requirements imposed by the Planning Commission

9-15

- 7
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9-15-040
to mitigate any adverse effects which may result from the
proposed modification.
(b) Subdivision, Single Family Lots: Except as provided in
Section
9-15-4
a. above, the minimum lot size and yard
requirements of the underlying zone shall apply except that
every lot shall have at least 3,500 square feet of "buildable
area".
The buildable area is the area where the slope is 30
percent or less, and shall be completely contiguous and have a
minimum dimension of 50 feet.
Lots shall allow dwelling
structures to be located within 250 feet from a public street.
All main and accessory buildings shall be built within the
buildable area.
(c) PUDs and Dwelliner Groups: Except as provided in Section
9-15-040 a. above, the density limitations of the underlying
zone shall apply except that all buildings shall be built upon
the "buildable area; consult Chapter 7 of this Title for PUD
density allowance. All dwelling units shall be located within
250 feet of a public street, or a private street that has been
approved by the Planning Commission.
For PUDs in areas where
the Hillside Overlay District applies, the minimum requirement
for common open space shall be 20 percent of the total project
area.
(d) Maximum Impervious Material Coverage: The total maximum
allowable coverage by impervious material within a project or
portion of a project within the Hillside Overlay District shall
not exceed 35 percent of the total project area. Areas of roofs
and driveways will be estimated and included in the total
impervious surface area.
9-15-050

Development

Standards

(a) Scope:
It is intended by this Chapter that the
development standards and provisions, as set forth herein, shall
be required in connection with all building and construction in
the Hillside Overlay District.
(b) Grading Drainage and Erosion: The area of the watershed
shall be used to determine the amount of storm water runoff
generated before and after construction.
(1) A grading and drainage report shall be prepared in
which the developer will describe the methods intended to be
employed
to
control
the
erosion
increase
while
in
construction.
(2) The developer/builder
is responsible
for interim
stabilization of all disturbed areas during the period of
9-15
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City Council Minutes
August 23, 1994
Page 5
The Council would like the agreement to include the following: the
developer hereby agrees to dedicate or donate and convey to the City, free
and clear, an acceptable undeveloped parcel consisting of at least 22 acres
designated for an equestrian center; and the land needed for a boarding
barn and restaurant may be deducted from this 22 acres and retained in
private ownership. The developer agrees to do the grading, fencing, and
put in the rings.
Another concern is the golf course. If the developer decides to sell, the
City will get the first right of refusal.
Paragraph 4.1.1 discusses the fact that only 10 model homes can be built
until Highland Drive is completed to the 1-15 freeway interchange. The
developers disagree with this. They maintain that there is a bond in place
to finish the road, and if the City needs to they can call their bond and
have the road completed.
7.5

Several residents spoke in opposition to the development. They are
opposed to the development and the road and they want a study done for
noise abatement.

7.6

Clair Huff noted that the discussion was good and the agreement still
needs a lot of work, therefore, he made a motion to continue approval of
the agreement. The motion was seconded by Jeff Rasmussen. Voting was
unanimous in the affirmative.

7.7

Paul Lunt asked that this be on the next agenda for the public meeting as
an action item.

8.0

ACTION ITEM: Approval of a waiver of the Hillside Ordinance for
Stephen E. Brendle on Lot 304 at The Cove at Bear Canvon Phase HI.

8.1

Jeff Rasmussen noted that the City Council took a field trip to the site.

8.2

Paul Glauser explained that the issues were presented last week in the
study meeting. Prior to that meeting they met with the Planning
Commission and asked them to look at the Hillside Ordinance and not
enforce the 30% development restrictions. The Planning Commission did
not agree, therefore, Mr. Brendle wants the Council to overturn this
decision.

8.3

Mr. Meyers presented a model of lot. 304 showing the bottom half of the
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City Council Minutes
August 23, 1994
Page 6
lot. They purchased the lot on the condition that they could build on the
top half of the lot They contacted Gordon Haight and he stated that they
needed a plot plan- Gordon agreed that it would be better to build on the
top half of the lot. Then they went to the Planning Department and got a
building permit. They surveyed, laid it out, excavated, dug the footings,
formed the footings and had the steel in the footings when a neighbor
complained and then the job was shut down. They did not buy the lot
until the building permit was issued. The subdivision was developed under
the Hillside Ordinance. The purpose of the Hillside Ordinance is to
prevent erosion and to preserve the natural vegetation, and maintaining
the hillside in its natural state. He pointed out exhibit 13 on page 9 which
lists three items that must be satisfied in order to continue to build: 1. No
significant harm will result; and 2. The proposed modification will result in
a more functional and improved plan; and 3. The developer/builder agrees
to comply with any conditions and requirements imposed by the Planning
Commission to mitigate any adverse effects which may result from the
proposed modification. The developer stated that the plat approved by the
City is not the same as the actual conditions are. He pointed out on the
model how the driveway will have to be cut into the hillside in order to get
access into the house. He feels that the placement of the house on the
bottom of the lot violates the intent of the Hillside Ordinance. It will scar
the hill and remove more vegetation. Mr. Haight, Mr. Glauser, and Mr.
Campbell all concur that the home should be placed on top of lot 304
because it is more functional, safer, and will have less impact. If the house
is built on the bottom of the lot, grading will be necessary due to sandy,
gravely soil. Retaining walls will also be necessary. It appears that
building on top will not have these problems. There will be no impact on
adjacent property. The house fits in and blends into the hillside.
8.4

Greg Phillips addressed the legal issues. His client came to the City and
did everything he thought he should do before closing on the lot. When
you rely on the City and do everything you can and the City says go ahead,
the City may be equitably estopped from changing the position. If you
look at the different standard in the Hillside Ordinance, the minimal harm
standard, there is going to be more harm by placing the home on the
bottom of the lot. The harm has already been done on top, the excavation
is done and the footings are done. It will create more harm if they are
forced to change. The views of neighbors are not a proper consideration
under the Hillside Ordinance.

8.5

Jerry Gerber is the owner of lot 312. She bought her lot with the
understanding that Draper City would not allow homes to be built on the
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City Council Minutes
August 23, 1994
Page 7
30% grade. The lots were priced accordingly. She went to Wasatch
Pacific and Terry Diehl showed her a letter where the committee had
approved Mr. Meyers request to build if he received a variance. At the
Planning Commission Meeting, Mr. Diehl said he did not approve the
building to be placed on the top of the lot. Development in Draper is
growing fast. The City will face this many times. The ordinances are to
guide builders and to help protect the landowners who bought their lots in
good faith.
8.6

Craig Cazier owns lots 316 and 317. They bought two lots so no one could
obstruct the view to the north. The house sites were put on the plat
before any lots were purchased. It was approved as a Draper subdivision.
Mr. Brendle had the same plat as Mr. Cazier. Money is not the object.
Craig noted that he has read the Hillside Ordinance and it states that no
building can be put on a 30% slope. There are a lot of ways to put in
driveways and retaining walls without moving too much vegetation. If the
home is built on top, the backfill will destroy all the vegetation and there
will have to be a retaining wall built for the fill, or the property will have
to be sloped out. Mr. Cazier's home will be built down in and this home
will obstruct his view to the north. The Hillside Ordinance says that no
building can be done on a 30% slope and we should stick to it.

8.7

Paul Lunt made a motion to deny the waiver of the Hillside Ordinance and
stated that Mr. Brendle will have to build where proposed when he bought
the lot. The reason is that this would be setting a precedence and if we go
against the Hillside Ordinance we will have a lot of problems. The motion
was seconded by Randy Gainer, noting that his reason was because
Gordon Haight's letter stated, "however this concurrence does not waive
any subdivision covenants, city ordinances, city building code or other
requirements that may be applicable". A roll call vote unanimously
approved the motion.

9.0

QUESTIONS FOR MAYOR AND COUNCIL.

9.1

Jeff Rasmussen thanked the Council for the opportunity to act as Mayor
Pro Tern.

9.2

Dave Campbell discussed items to be scheduled on the upcoming agendas.

9.3

Clair Huff made a motion to adjourn at 9:53 P.M. The motion was
seconded by Randy Gainer. Voting was unanimous in the affirmative.

n
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be enclosed by a six-foot high fence and motion detection
security lighting.
6

Tom Suchoski made a motion to recommend approval of a
Conditional-Use Permit to construct a cellular communications
tower on approximately 3,100 square feet of leased property in
a C-3 zone with the following conditions: Staff Report dated
April 13, 1995; and that the tower have a maximum limit of 60f eet.
The motion was seconded by Don McCormick and passed
unanimously on a roll call vote.

0 ACTION ITEM
Reconsideration of the request to build a house in 30% slope
area in the Hillside Overlay for Stephen Brendle on Lot 304 of
Cove at Bear Canyon Subdivision.
1

Paul Glauser said this matter came before the Planning
Commission last summer and was denied.
The City Council
upheld the findings of the Planning Commission and also denied
the request. The applicant challenged the City's actions in
court and the judge ruled in the City's favor. They are again
requesting that they be allowed to build a house in a 30%
slope area because there is no longer opposition to their
building in the proposed area.

2

Dick Maires said this request is subject to the Hillside
Ordinance and there are extenuating circumstances. He feels
strongly the Planning Commission should take another look at
the proposal. Mr. Maires stated the Planning Commission has
the authority to modify the Hillside Ordinance if no
significant harm results and if the proposed modification will
result in a more functional and improved plan; that the
developer and the builder agree to comply with any
restrictions.
City Engineer Gordon Haight was contacted to find out what was
required in order to build a house on the top area and they
were given certain criteria. Mr. Haight looked at the lot and
commented it would be better to put the house on top. Mr.
Maires received a building permit and started construction.
The job was stopped because a lot owner complained, who has
since turned his lot back to the developer. The developer has
indicated he backs the location of the house and will make
sure anyone buying a piece of property is aware of the
situation.
Mr. Maires explained a home on the bottom portion of the lot
does everything contrary to what the Planning Commission is
trying to do with the Hillside Ordinance. The upper part of
the lot would not require any more excavation than has been
done and the vegetation in front and sides of the house will
be maintained to the street. The slope from the street to the
9
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front of the house is 26%, the south side slope is 32%, the
north side slope is 30%. He said the staff is unanimous in
their concurrence that the location on the upper end of the
property would be best.
3

Paul Glauser spoke to Terry Diehl and was told he would notify
any future buyers of the change in. building plans.
The
developer stated this home is hundreds of feet from any homes
being planned at this time.

4

Paul Jones made a motion to approve Mr. Maires' request to
build the home as proposed on Lot 3 04 of Cove at Bear Canyon
Subdivision, because the understanding of the Planning
Commission is that there will be no significant harm caused by
building the home at the proposed location; the proposed
modification will result in a more functional and improved
plan; and there are no surrounding property owners who have
different expectations of the lot, that would interfere with
going ahead with the building.
The motion was seconded by
Dale Howlett and passed on a vote of 5-1 with Tom Suchoski
voting no.

5

Tom Suchoski stated, as a point of interest, they have a very
difficult time finding no significant harm in this when the
previous motion found significant harm. Either the Planning
Commission contradicts themselves, or they cannot make that
finding.
Paul Glauser said they can find that because the
view is no longer the issue, that was the primary harm. Mr.
Suchoski said the significant harm was erosion and damage to
the environment.

6

Ross Richins voted against it previously because of the
precedence, and felt the home could be modified in order to
use the lower part of the lot. He stated he is convinced now
that the upper part of the lot is the best place to build.

7

Paul Jones said perhaps it would be better to state the
justification for the reason as being that, different
information has been submitted, and the change in the cut in
the slope of the lower portion as a result of the road cut of
the actual construction versus the design.
Mr. Diehl
indicated early on that the road was constructed according to
the plans and, as far as the information he had available, it
was correct for the lower portion of the property. The lower
site would not be buildable given its current configurations
and there is less environmental harm in the upper portion of
the lot at this point of time. Paul Jones said that is what
he implied by his statement that the least amount of impact on
the hillside would be to build the home on the upper part of
the lot.

10
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Robin Frank made a motion to extend the meeting past 10:00 p.m.
The motion was seconded and passed on a vote of 5-1 with Tom
Suchoski voting no.
8.0 PUBLIC HEARING
CONDITIONAL-USE PERMIT
Marie Osborne is requesting approval of a Conditional-Use
Permit to allow the operation of a beauty shop in an existing
residential structure located in an RR-43 zone at 11580 South
700 West.
8.1

Marie Osborne explained she is proposing a business in her
home with no structure change. She had a shop built in for
the purpose of providing a service for her family. She said
there is adequate parking and does not feel she would disturb
anyone.
She does not plan on having a sign.
There is a
separate entrance on the northwest side of the house.

8.2

Don McCormick asked the applicant if she agreed with Staff
Recommendation #3 regarding the hours of operation.
Mrs.
Osborne asked that the hours be extended from 6:30 a.m. to
9:00 p.m.

8.3

Chairman Kimball opened the public hearing.

8.4

Suellen Rifkin lives across the street from the applicant and
is in support.
She feels many people have this type of
business in their home that never comply with City Ordinances.
She does not have a problem with adjusting the hours of
operation.

8.5

Sandra Ball has no problem with the proposed home occupation.

8.6

Nicole Davis said she is very supportive of home businesses.
Signage would be a concern to her.

8.7

Tom Suchoski made a motion to recommend approval of a
Conditional-Use Permit for a beauty salon located in an
existing residence at 11580 South 700 West, subject to the
following conditions:
recommendations of the staff report
dated April 13, 1995, with the exception that Staff
Recommendation #3 be modified to extend the hours from 6:00
a.m. until 9:00 p.m.; and if the light traffic is more than
anticipated, the Conditional-Use Permit could be subject to
review. The motion was seconded by Dale Howlett and passed
unanimously on a roll call vote.

9.0 ACTION ITEM
Further consideration of American Heritage Apartments at approx.
11800 South State Street (continued from previous meetings).

11
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PLANNING COMMISSION MINUTES

MINUTES OF THE DRAPER CITY PLANNING COMMISSION HELD JUNE 8, 1995,
IN THE COUNCIL CHAMBERS OF DRAPER CITY HALL.
MEMBERS PRESENT: Chairman Lyn Kimball, Tom Suchoski, Dale
Howlett, Ross Richins, Paul Jones.
OTHERS PRESENT:

Paul Glauser, Bruce Talbot, Rob Smetana, Holly
Barney, Craig Cazier, Carry Cazier, Jeri
Gerber, Max Gerber, Mike Burrows, Mark Wilkey,
Dick Maires, Bev Stats, Chris Gaminrovias,
David Fairbourn, Scott Waldron, Wayde Mackay,
McKay Douglas, Jacob Douglas, Paul Frampton,
Grant Beagley, Mark Wetzer, Don Gunn, Loraine
Sundquist, Norman Squires, Bob Drennan, Suellen
Riffkin, Paula Williams, Guilford Raud, Sherry
O'Meara, David Jenson, George Richards, Mark
Wilkey, Stephen Brendle, and Linda Dunlavy.

FIELD TRIP - 6:00 P.M.
The Commissioners visited sites on the agenda.
BUSINESS MEETING - 7:00 P.M.
Chairman Kimball opened the meeting at 7:10 p.m., and welcomed
those attending.
1.0 ACTION ITEM
APPROVAL of the minutes from May 18, 1995, and May 25, 1995,
meetings.
1.1

Dale Howlett made a motion to approve the minutes of May 18
and 25, 1995 as amended. The motion was seconded by Ross
Richins and passed unanimously.

2.0 ACTION ITEM
APPROVAL of the June 8, 1995, Consent Calendar.
2.1

Dale Howlett made a motion to approve the June 8, 1995,
Consent Calendar. The motion was seconded by Tom Suchoski
and passed unanimously on a roll call vote.

3.0 ACTION ITEM
Reconsideration of the request to build a house in 30% slope
area, lot 3 04 of COVE AT BEAR CANYON SUBDIVISION.
3.1

Paul Glauser stated that originally the Planning Commission
and City Council turned down a request from Mr. Brendle to
build a house on lot 3 04, Cove at Bear Canyon Subdivision.
In March 1995 Mr. Brendle and the developer of the
15
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subdivision represented to the City that opposition by lot
owners to the east to building a house no longer existed.
The Planning Commission granted Mr. Brendle permission to
build a house in the 30% slope portion of lot 304 because
there was no opposition. Since that time the City has been
approached by owners of lots in the area stating they do
oppose the construction of the home on the 30% portion of
the lot and that it was misrepresented that they did not
oppose the matter. The City Attorney advised that the
matter be reconsidered because of allegations that the
Planning Commission received incorrect information on April
20, 1995, and the decision was influenced by that
information.
2

Mark Wilkey, attorney for the applicant, stated the
applicant contends that the Planning Commission lacks
jurisdiction to reconsider this matter. It was properly
brought before the Commission on April 20, 1995, and passed
on a 5-1 vote. He further stated all of the factors set
forth in the Hillside Ordinance were properly considered.
The Ordinance allows a 3 0-day period for appeal and none
were filed. The applicant has poured the foundation and are
into the project over $100,000. He feels they have a vested
right to proceed. In the event the matter is reconsidered,
the applicant will seek an injunction to allow completion of
the project.

3

Chairman Kimball stated the matter would be heard on the
basis that the information used to render a decision may not
have been the information needed.

4

Max Gerber has opposed the proposal since it was originally
heard by the Planning Commission. The applicant was told to
remove the forms and restore the slope. Everything that was
submitted was misrepresented. The lot will affect the next
lot because it has the same slope problem and it will effect
his view and the lots were sold as view lots.

5

Jerry Gerber said they were not notified that Mr. Brendle
intended to continue building. She would like to see
everyone secure in what they buy.

6

Craig Cazier said he opposed this matter from the beginning.
He was not notified that the matter was going to be heard by
the Planning Commission a second time. He opposes it
because it is going to ruin the entire subdivision. He
feels the hillside could be beautiful.

7

Steve Brendle said he has tried to do everything required.
He was issued a building permit and started construction.
He explained the developer told him there was no opposition
to the project and told him he should go back to the
16

QJ*

Planning Commission with a letter containing the information
he received from the developer. Mr. Brendle asked that the
Planning Commission allow him to finish building his home.
3.8

Pamela Richardson stated Mr. Brendle builds quality homes
and feels it will add a positive addition to the
subdivision. She does not feel Mr. Brendle should be
penalized and should be decided on a case-by-case basis.

3.9

Ernie Floyd recently purchased lot 314. He suggested that
the pitch of the roof could be changed to make the house
four feet less above street level than is currently planned.

3.10 Terry Diehl stated he is the developer of the subdivision
and asked to go on record that he has never represented
whether there would be opposition or not. He did represent
that originally there was opposition. He said he did not
have any lots across the street sold and the Gerber's were
selling their lot and that is why he did not feel there was
any opposition.
3.11 Mark Wilkey stated he does not feel a precedent has been
set, but the Hillside Ordinance requires a case by case
consideration. Technically the City has felt it would be
better to build on the top part of the lot. He feels this
is Draper City's problem since there was no public notice
given, and his client should not be penalized.
3.12 Mr. Cazier stated the Planning Commission heard it once
before and denied it. There was misinformation given to the
Planning Commission.
3.13 Mr. Brendle stated he would consider the change of pitch for
the roof after he studied it.
3.14 Ross Richins stated he changed his original vote on this
matter on the basis that the upper location was the best
location for the home. Paul Glauser said from a technical
standpoint the top location is better, but that is not the
only consideration. Mr. Richins voted against the initial
proposal because he felt the house could be modified and the
bottom lot used. Paul Glauser said some kind of house could
be built on the lower portion of the lot to mitigate the
problems with the lot.
3.15 Tom Suchoski stated he has voted against this issue both
times. The second time it came before the Planning
Commission he did not feel the developer had done anything
to address the consideration of a house on the bottom lot.
The upper portion is a better location for that specific
house.
17
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3.16 Chairman Kimball said as he looked at the area, it is his
opinion that if the house were built it would not
significantly affect the view of surrounding homes even if
it maintained the 16 feet above the elevation of the road.
A precedence would not be set since the Hillside Ordinance
is considered on a case by case ba^is. Those that have
purchased lots are not guaranteed an unobstructed view.
Chairman Kimball said if he were voting he would allow the
building to resume.
3.17 Paul Jones said the Planning Commission should not be
dealing with the issue of views but only with the
suitability of building. Dale Howlett agreed the Planning
Commission cannot guarantee views.
3.18 Ross Richins stated the information he has indicates the
upper portion of the lot is the best place to build. He
would not mind putting a restriction on the builder to try
to incorporate lowering the pitch of the roof to give the
added four feet.
3.19 Tom Suchoski said there is an Ordinance in place that states
that homes are not built on slopes greater than 30%. He
could justify building on a slope of greater than 30% if it
were in the City's interest to allow the development to
occur, otherwise he feels that a precedence is being set.
He does not feel the lot is buildable. Mr. Suchoski also
stated no alternatives were presented to the Commission to
make building on the lower part of the lot acceptable.
3.20 Dale Howlett made a motion to stay with the decision made at
the last hearing and allow the house to built on the upper
portion of the lot because there is less disturbance of the
slope and natural vegetation than there would be if building
was done on the lower portion of the lot; it would be a
better location for a house; and when the subdivision was
platted, the lot was considered a buildable lot at that
time. The motion was seconded by Ross Richins and passed on
a vote of 3-1 with Tom Suchoski voting no.
4.0 ACTION ITEM
Recommendation of Sign Ordinance (continued from previous
meetings).
4.1

Rob Smetana reviewed the following changes: a section on
'Violations and Enforcement' was completed with wording from
the City Attorney; maximum height on temporary signs was
raised from six to seven feet; a section was added regarding
off-premise residential development direction signs; nonprofit was added to signs for events requiring a sign permit
to cover such items as the Utah Homeshow and to allow one
18
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on-site and three off-site signs per event; the amortization
schedule lists three options.
2

Paul Glauser said a sign could be brought into compliance if
there was a change in ownership of the property or business,
but it needs to be specific.

3

Tom Suchoski said the change should be made when the
business is changed.

4

Dale Howlett stated he would like to delete option #3 on the
amortization schedule. He does not feel there are very many
nonconforming signs at the present time and it would not be
adverse to the City to allow those signs to stay.

5

Ross Richins feels the playing field should be level and
that everyone should be equal. Mr. Richins prefers the 4-6
year amortization schedule.

6

Paul Jones suggested, if changes were made to the building,
the owner be required to bring their sign into conformity.

7

Paul Glauser explained that the City has a section in the
ordinance dealing with nonconforming uses that states, if
changes are made regarding the fundamental use of the
building or increase the value, they have to meet all
current standards. Paul Jones stated he would like the
nonconforming clause to apply to the signs.

8

Dale Howlett said the amortization schedule is going to
create a climate of lawsuits and there will be a hard time
enforcing the ordinance. He does not feel right asking
people to take down signs that the City has approved.

9

Chairman Kimball said those that currently have signs
obtained a permit for their sign. The current applicants
understand the changes that are being considered.

10 Tom Suchoski agreed with Mr. Howlett's comments on
nonconforming signs. He would like to have the stipulation
that on a change of business or a major remodel of the
business, nonconforming signs would have to be modified.
11 Paul Jones said there are minor changes needed in the
definition section and that all definitions should be
included in one place.
12 Tom Suchoski said he feels there needs to be more than two
temporary residential development signs in some situations.
Paul Jones suggested that two be a standard amount, but
people be allowed to apply for more. Paul Glauser said
language could be included stating staff could consider
19
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CITY COUNCIL MINUTES

MINUTES OF THE CITY COUNCIL MEETING HELD JUNE 13, 1995 IN THE
COUNCIL CHAMBERS OF DRAPER CITY HALL.
MEMBERS PRESENT: Mayor Elaine Redd, Councilman Randy Gainer,
Councilman Clair Huff, Councilman Paul Lunt,
Councilman Jeff Rasmussen, and Councilman Darrell
Smith.
OTHERS PRESENT:

Paul Glauser, Barbara Sadler, Mike Mehraban,
Jerry Blair, Ron Smith, Jim Day, Joyce Day, Pat
Smith, Jeri Gerber, Lyle McAllister, Doug Bedke,
Rob Allen, Debbie Coon, Lynn Coon, Terry Diehl,
Sue Whittington, Jer^y T. Walton, Richard Walton,
Rick Smith, Ben '"Williams, Paula Williams,
Beatrice Avery, Shelly O'Meara, Craig Cazier, Dee
Christiansen, Cliff Hales, LaRae Hales, and Linda
Dunlavy.

Councilman Lunt made a motion to close the executive session. The
motion was seconded by Councilman Huff and passed unanimously.
1.0

Welcome.

1.1

Mayor Redd began the meeting at 7:15 p.m., and welcomed those
attending.

2.0

Pledge of Allegiance.

2.1

The Pledge of Allegiance was led by Dee Christiansen.

3.0

Prayer.

3.1

The prayer was given by Joyce Day.

4.0

Approval of Minutes for June 6, 1995.

4.1

Councilman Huff moved that the minutes of June 6, 1995, be
approved as amended. The motion was seconded by Councilman
Smith and passed on a voice vote with Councilman Gainer
abstaining.

5.0

Oath of Office for Doug Bedke, new member of the Board of
Adjustments and Clark Naylor, new member of the Parks, Trails
and Open Space Committee.

5.1

Mr. Doug Bedke was sworn in as a member of the Board of
Adjustments by City Recorder Barbara Sadler.
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14.1 This item will be continued to a later meeting.
15.0 ACTION ITEM:
Appeal of June 8, 1995 Planning Commission
decision on the request to build a house in a 30% slope area
at Lot 3 04 of COVE AT BEAR CANYON SUBDIVISION.
15.1 Paul Glauser stated the history of this issue is documented in
the staff report. It was heard last year and was denied. A
new application was submitted this year on the basis that
conditions had changed, which may change the outcome of the
decision. Last week the Planning Commission heard this matter
and approved it on a 3-1 vote. The following day an appeal
was made by a neighboring property owner. Notifications were
mailed to the twelve known owners of lots in Phase III of this
subdivision regarding this meeting as a courtesy.
15.2 Mark Wilke, attorney for Mr. Brendle, stated he does not feel
that the City Council has jurisdiction to hear this matter
which was resolved earlier. At the April 20, 1995 time frame
there was a two-week period of appeal. It was reconsidered
last week over their objection and passed again. His client
has put substantial money into the property and feels he has
a vested right to go forward and develop the lot.
15.3 Craig Cazier stated he owns lots 316 and 317.
He was in
attendance to oppose this matter the last time it was heard by
the City Council as well as attending the Planning Commission
last week in opposition. Mr. Cazier feels a precedent has
been set by the Planning Commission.
The Ordinance states
there is no building on a 30% slope.
When the lots were
purchased it was detailed as to where the houses were to go on
the lots. Mr. Cazier feels that the values of the property
will decrease if this is allowed.
15.4 Councilman Rasmussen said Mr. Cazier had stated he purchased
view lots and was told where a home could be built on those
lots.
Mr. Cazier said Mr. Brendle's lot was one of the
cheaper lots in the subdivision and was designated to have a
home built on the lower street.
Gerber7 s were the first
people to purchase their lot and Mr. Cazier was second or
third. They were told the houses were not to be built in a
3 0% slope and every lot showed the area where a home could be
built.
15.5 Jeri Gerber stated she owns lot 312 and bought the lot
expecting that when it was filed with the County it was legal
and that homes where not allowed to be built on a 30% slope.
Mrs. Gerber stated the lot was priced as it was because of the
view.
She feels the Hillside Ordinance is part of orderly
growth in Draper. She also stated that last year the Planning
Commission and the City Council instructed Mr. Brendle to
remove his forms and to study new plans and he did neither.
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He was told that if he continued construction it was at his
risk.
Mrs. Gerber feels she has as much invested as Mr.
Brendle. This matter was refused by the Planning Commission
and the City Council last year. It was brought back to the
Planning Commission because of a letter from the developer
stating there was no opposition. She does not know why the
developer said there was no opposition when he knew the
feelings of the Gerbers and Caziers.
She suggested Mr.
Brendle follow the outline he was given by the Planning
Commission and City Council last year.
6 Councilman Rasmussen asked if there was a significant
difference in the price of the Gerber and Cazier lots and Mr.
Brendle's lot. Mrs. Gerber stated she believes Mr. Brendle
paid $55,000 for his lot; the Gerbers paid $90,500; Mr. Cazier
paid $95,000 and $115,000 for his lots.
7 Pam Richards stated she owns Lot 310 and did not know there
was a pecking order depending on how much was paid for the
lot. There were mistakes from the beginning and Ms. Richards
feels the applicant was given approval by the Planning
Commission and that approval should be set in stone. She also
feels that views cannot be guaranteed in a subdivision.
8 Councilman Smith asked Mr. Brendle if he was given the same
direction as other property on where the house should be
built. Mr. Brendle stated that originally his offer on the
property was contingent upon the house being located on the
upper portion of the lot. Mr. Brendle stated he bought the
lot after the road was cut.
9 Mr. Cazier said there is one sewer lateral and water meter for
each lot and they are located on the lower street in Mr.
Brendle's lot.
10

Mr. Maires said the lot was bought on the option of being
able to get the home site moved from the bottom of the lot
to the top. Gordon Haight and Lee Holmstead were contacted
and they approved moving the home to the upper portion of
the lot.
Councilman Lunt stated the City Engineer and
Building Inspector cannot approve that kind of request. A
building permit was issued and the work was later stopped.
Both the Planning Commission and City Council upheld that
decision.
At the last Planning Commission meeting the
request was approved. He explained that the situation on
the lot is entirely different than the original plat shows.
He also stated that lot prices have dropped at this time on
remaining lots and the price should not be a consideration.
He feels the decision from the Planning Commission was
based on the Hillside Ordinance. If the house is built on
the lower portion of the lot the driveway will have a slope
of 20% which is in violation of Draper City requirements.
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Mr. Maires said they put an option on the lot but did not
purchase it until after they were issued a building permit.
15.11

Councilman Gainer asked if the lot was purchased knowing
the sewer lateral and water stub were at the bottom of the
lot. Mr. Brendle stated he did not think it was an issue.

Councilman Smith moved that the meeting be extended to 10:15 p.m.
The motion was seconded by Councilman Smith and passed unanimously.
15.12

Mr. Brendle explained the site in question. He stated he
has tried to do everything right.
The City of Draper
issued a building permit and he then closed on the land.
The neighbor that complained is 400 feet away and does not
even see his property.
Mr. Brendle stated the requests
regarding the Hillside Ordinance are looked at on a case by
case basis. He is planning on building a $455,000 house
and feels it will help the subdivision. He stated he has
tried to discuss the matter with Mr. Cazier and he will not
talk to him. The people directly across from his property
do not have a problem with him building the house. Mr.
Brendle said he and Paul Glauser were both told by Terry
Diehl that there was no opposition to the request. He told
the developer to take the property back and Mr. Diehl
suggested he go to the City Council again because there* was
no more opposition. Mr. Brendle asked about Craig Cazier
and Mr. Diehl said he was not a problem. Mr. Brendle said
he has spent over $100,000 and has committed an additional
$150,000. He was told this was a buildable lot. The staff
was in favor of moving the location of the house to the
upper portion of the lot. He requested that he be allowed
to complete his house.

15.13

Paul Glauser explained Lee Holmstead issued a building
permit to the applicant, the forms for the footings were
set, and at that time the City received complaints from the
neighbors.
Mr. Holmstead was requested to issue a stop
work order on the house at that time. Mr. Glauser said a
certified letter was sent to Mr. Brendle stating the matt
er was being reconsidered by the Planning Commission and
suggested if he proceed it was at his own risk. The forms
were set and the concrete poured after he was told he was
proceeding at his own risk.

15.14

Councilman Gainer made a motion to reverse the decision of
the Planning Commission to allow modification of the
Hillside Ordinance because there is no new evidence from a
year ago. The original property owners of the upper lots
purchased those lots for a reason and also have a vested
right.
The motion was seconded by Councilman Lunt and
passed unanimously on a roll call vote.
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16.0 QUESTIONS FOR MAYOR AND COUNCIL.
16.1 Councilman Rasmussen felt Mr. Arnold was
integrity with a desire to do what is right in
He asked that Debby Wilson let him know the
Council and help him in locating a commercial

a person with
the wrong spot.
feeling of the
site.

16.2 Joyce Day asked where the water is coming from for the
Pinnacle Point apartments and the South Mountain area.
Councilman Rasmussen stated he would like to see the City
install a line under 1-15 to furnish the water. Mayor Redd
stated the City will be providing water.
She also stated
South Mountain is committed to revegetate and is currently
developing retention ponds.
16.3 Wally Stewart said a new water line is being installed along
the west frontage road and dirt has been left south of the
entrance to Greenfield Farms which makes it difficult to see
any traffic coming from the prison unless you enter the road.
Paul Glauser will check on the situation.
17.0 ADJOURNMENT.
17.1 Councilman Lunt made a motion to continue the executive
session.
The motion was seconded by Councilman Gainer and
passed unanimously. The meeting adjourned at 10:20 p.m.
Submitted by:
Linda Dunlavy
Minutes Secretary.
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MICHAEL Z. HAYES - 1432
MICHAEL J. MAZURAN - 213 6
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C.
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-6600
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
STEPHEN E. BRENDLE, an
individual and RICHARD L.
MAIRES, an individual

:
:
:

RULING AND ORDER

:

Civil No. 940905958AA

vs.

:

Judge Anne M. Stirba

THE CITY OF DRAPER, a Utah
municipality

:
:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

:
oooOooo

Plaintiff's Motion for Review came on for hearing on
Monday, March 6, 1995, at the hour of 2:00 p.m., Plaintiff's were
present and represented by their counsel Gregory D. Phillips and
Defendant, Draper City, was represented by its counsel, Michael Z.
Hayes, and the Court having reviewed the pleadings that were filed
in connection with this Motion for Review and having read the cases
that

were

submitted

to

the

Court

and

having

considered

the

arguments of counsel and based upon the bench ruling of this Court
given

on Friday,

reference,

the

March

Court

10, 1995, incorporated

makes

the

following

herein by

Findings

of

this
Fact,

Conclusion of Law and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

During all pertinent periods of time the Petitioners

had a copy of the Draper City Hillside Overlay Ordinance which

21

prohibits development on slope areas in excess of thirty percent
(30%) unless

the 30% requirement

is modified

by

the

Planning

Commission and Petitioners are deemed to have knowledge of the
requirements of the Ordinance.
2.

The Planning Commission is the only body that may

modify the 30% requirement based upon its finding that

(1) no

significant harm will result and (2) the proposed modification will
result

in

Developer

a more

functional

or builder

agrees

and

improved

plan;

to comply with

and

(3)

any conditions

the
or

requirements imposed by the Planning Commission to mitigate adverse
affects which may result from the proposed modification.
3.

The Planning Commission determined that there would

be significant harm that would result to the uphill owners if
Petitioners were allowed to place their home on the east portion of
the lot in that their views would be obstructed.
4.

There was evidence before the Planning Commission

that the building of the home on the east end of the lot would
significantly harm the uphill property owners in that their views
would be obstructed.
5.

This Court does not have the authority to substitute

its judgment for that of the Planning Commission.
6.

The

employees

of

Draper

City

who

Petitioners

communicated with did not have the authority to modify the slope
requirements.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1.
Council
p\dc-bren.ord

in

The decision of the Planning Commission and City
refusing

to modify

the

slope

requirements

of

the

Hillside

Overlay

District

Ordinance

was

not

arbitrary

and

capricious•
2.

Draper City is not equitably estopped from enforcing

the provisions of its zoning ordinances against Petitioners.
3.
Adjustment,

The

Draper

City

properly heard

Council,

the appeal

of

not

the

Board

the decision

of

of
the

Planning Commission.
ORDER
Therefore,

based upon the Findings of this Court and its

Conclusions of Law# it is hereby ordered that Petitioners Motion
for Review be dismissed with prejudice and that the decision of the
Planning Commission and City Council of Draper City in refusing to
modify the slope requirements on Petitioners property is affirmed.
The parties are ordered to bear their own costs incurred in this
appeal•
DATED this

J&

day of April/ 1995.

I*

District Court Judcre

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Gregory
At tome*

p\dc-bren.ord

^

Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review, Case No. 940905958AA

<K>

Gregory D. Phillips, Esq. (4645)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Stephen E. Brendle
and Richard L. Maires

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEPHEN E. BRENDLE, an individual
and RICHARD L. MAIRES, an individual
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE CITY OF DRAPER,
a Utah municipality
Defendant.

;)
;)
)
])
)
])

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR
REVIEW OF DRAPER CITY'S
DECISION TO UPHOLD
ISSUANCE OF THE
STOP WORK ORDER

;l
]
i
]

Civil No. 94 09059588A
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Plaintiffs Stephen E. Brendle and Richard L. Maires (collectively "Petitioners")
submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Review of the Draper City
Council's decision to uphold issuance of a Stop Work Order dated June 13, 1994.

(5632-1\«eio.sa)
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INTRODUCTION
This Court is asked to review Draper City's application and administration of its
Hillside Zoning Ordinance as applied to the construction of a high-end, custom home on
a lot in the foothills of Draper. Before purchasing the lot and commencing construction,
Petitioners sought and obtained Draper City's zoning approval to construct the home on the
East or upper end of the lot on a slope of approximately 30%. Draper City issued a Stop
Work Order after some owners of neighboring lots complained that their views might be
obstructed. The Draper City Council upheld the issuance of the Stop Work Order.
Petitioners' Motion for Review of Draper City's decision is made pursuant to
Sections 10-9-1001(2) and 10-9-708(1) of The Municipal Land Use Development and
Management Act (the "Land Use Act") of the Utah Code Annotated (1992).1
As more fully set forth below, this Court should reverse the Draper City Council's
decision to uphold the Stop Work Order for three reasons. First, the Council's decision was
arbitrary and capricious because, among other reasons, Draper City's own experts—both the
Draper City Engineer and Building Official-agreed that placement of the house on the
upper end of the lot would better serve the purposes of the Hillside Zoning Ordinance.

1

Section 10-9-1001(2) provides that "[a]ny person adversely affected by any decision
made in the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered." Section
10-9-708 similarly provides that rr[a]ny person adversely affected by any decision of a board
of adjustment may petition the district court for a review of the decision."
(5632-1\^e«o.sa)

1

m

Second, Draper City is equitably estopped from issuing the Stop Work Order. In reliance
upon Draper City's zoning approval and issuance of the Building Permit, Petitioners
purchased the lot and began construction. Third, the City Council's decision was illegal
because under Section 10-9-703 of the Land Use Act "appeals from zoning decisions
applying the zoning ordinance" "shall" be heard by the Board of Adjustment, not the City
Council.
STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
In cases such as this where there is a record of the minutes and a transcript of the
proceedings before the Draper Planning Commission and City Council, this Court's review
is limited to the record below. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708(5). See also Xanthos v. Board
of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Utah 1984). The following
Statement of Facts is based on the record below and Draper City's admissions in its Answer
to Petition dated October 10, 1994 ("Answer") on file with this Court:
1.

On December 7, 1993, the Draper City Council passed and adopted the

"Hillside Overlay District As Part of the Zoning Ordinances" of Draper (the "Hillside
Zoning Ordinance"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
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2.

On April 5, 1994, Petitioners entered into an Option Agreement to purchase

Lot 304 in the Cove at Bear Canyon (the "Lot") "contingent on approval from Draper City
to locate the home on the East end of lot." Exhibit B-3 hereto.2
3.

On April 6, 1994, Draper City Engineer and Public Works Director, Gordon

M. Haight, II, P.E. (the "City Engineer"), conducted an on-site inspection of the Lot to
determine whether the home should be located on the East end of the Lot or at the West
end of the Lot as originally contemplated by the developer and seller of the Lot. Petition
for Review ("Petition") at II 5. Answer at 11 4.
4.

On April 12,1994, the City Engineer wrote a letter to Petitioners "concurring]

with the relocation of the home in lot #304." Exhibit B-5 hereto. This letter, however,
stated that "this concurrence does not waive any subdivision covenants, City ordinances, City
building codes, or any other requirement that may be applicable." Id.
5.

Because of the last statement in the April 12,1994 letter, Petitioners, on April

18, 1994, applied for a Building Permit from Draper City, submitted plot plans and building
plans with the home site on the East end of the Lot, and sought zoning approval for placing
the home on the East end of the Lot. Petition at 11 7; Answer at U 5. Transcript of City
Council Meeting of August 23, 1994 (hereinafter "Council Tr.") at p.5, attached hereto as

2

Exhibits B-0 through B-16 were submitted to the Draper City Council.
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Exhibit "C"; City Council Minutes (hereinafter "Council Minutes"), 11 8.4 at p.6, attached
hereto as Exhibit "D."
6.

Lee Holmstead, the Draper City Building Official, made the following

statement at the Draper City Planning Commission Meeting of June 23, 1994 about issuing
the Building Permit and granting zoning approval:
I think maybe. We issued a permit we thought everything was ok or
we would not have issued a permit when it came in. I don't know if that is
the plot plan they brought in or not, but it showed where the home was
supposed to be located exactly. He wanted to move it above. I said is that
part of the restrictive covenants - does that have to put down there. He says
no, he didn't think so, there's no problem. Well I can't tell you you can put
it up there. Go the City Engineer, if he'll ok it I'll ok it. And after many
conversations with Gordon [Haight], Gordon [Haight] came back to me and
said he feels it would be better up there [at the East end of the Lot] and I
said I feel it would be better up there than seen here from a safety point. He
said if you have it down below you would have to put a humongous retaining
wall, or you have to cut the hill back to a 2/1 slope. If you cut the hill to a
2/1 slope, the slope will be dropping down gravel and sand on the house all
the time. So you need to put in a humongous retaining wall. So as a safety
feature, factors I feel it is better and so does Gordon [Haight] up on the top
[at the East end of the Lot].
Transcript of Planning Commission Meeting (hereinafter "P. Comm'n Tr.") at 11, attached
hereto as Exhibit B-12.
7.
Permit.

On April 22, 1994, Draper City approved the zoning and issued the Building
A copy of the Building Permit is attached hereto as Exhibit "B-6." "All city

departments had received the plans and given their approval. . . ." Letter of August 12,
1994 to Mayor Elaine Redd and Draper City Council attached hereto as Exhibit "B-0."
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8.

In reliance upon Draper City's issuance of the Building Permit and granting

zoning approval allowing construction on the East end of the Lot, Petitioners exercised the
Option Agreement and purchased the Lot on April 24, 1994 for $61,000. Exhibit B-3
hereto.
9.

On April 27, 1994, Petitioners commenced construction on the Lot. Exhibit

B-2 hereto.
10.

In June 1994, Draper City received complaints from owners of neighboring

lots that Petitioners' home might obstruct their views, and that the developer at Cove at
Bear Canyon had verbally assured them that no home would obstruct their view. Petition
at 11 11; Answer at H 2. Petitioners "were told a neighbor 400 feet to the North, across the
street, their Lot sitting approximately 20 feet higher, complained we were going to block
their view." Exhibit "B-0."
11.

Based on these Complaints, Draper City issued a Stop Work Order on June

13, 1994. Id.
12.

Petitioners appeared before the Draper Planning Commission on June 23,

1994. Owners of the neighboring lots objected at the meeting that their views might be
obstructed. The Planning Commission upheld the issuance of the Stop Work Order by a
4 to 2 vote. Petition at 11 13; Answer at 11 2.
13.

At the direction of Draper City officials, who relied upon Section 6-1-4 of the

Land Use and Development Regulations of Draper, Utah, Petitioners appealed the Planning
Commission's decision to the Draper City Council. Section 6-1-4A provides that "[a]ny
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person shall have the right to appeal any decision rendered by the Planning Commission to
the City Council" Petition at 11 14; Answer at 11 8.
14.

On August 23, 1994, the appeal of the decision of the Planning Commission

was heard by the Draper City Council Again owners of the neighboring lots objected that
their views might be obstructed. Petition at 11 15; Answer at 11 2.
15.

At this hearing, Petitioners presented evidence that the three factors set forth

in Section 9-15-4(a) of the Hillside Zoning Ordinance to allow construction on a slope
exceeding 30% were satisfied. Council Minutes, Section 8.3, at p.6. The three factors are:
(1)

No significant harm will result; and

(2)

The proposed modification will result in a more functional and
improved plan; and

(3)

The developer/builder agrees to comply with any conditions and
requirements imposed by the Planning Commission to mitigate
any adverse effects which may result from the proposed
modification.

Section 9-15-4(a), Hillside Zoning Ordinance, Exhibit "A."
16.

Specifically, Petitioners presented evidence that the developer of the

subdivision made road cuts in the subdivision different from the plat approved by Draper
City. Council Minutes, 11 8.3 at p.6, Exhibit "D"; Council Tr. at 2, Exhibit MC." As a result
of these different road cuts, placement of the home at the bottom (West end) of the Lot
would cause scarring, removal of vegetation, and erosion that would be avoided if the home
were placed on the top (East end) of the Lot. Council Minutes, 11 8.4 at p.6, Exhibit "D";
(5632-1\«e^o.sa)
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Council Tr. at 3, Exhibit "C." Because of the road cuts, placement at the home at the lower
end of the Lot would also cause the home to be placed on a slope greatly exceeding 30%.

17. Petitioners presented evidence that the Draper City Engineer, Mr. Haight, the
Draper City Building Official, Lee Holmstead, the Draper City Manager, David Campbell,
and the Draper City Director of Economic Development, Paul Glauser, all agree "that the
home should be placed on the top of Lot 304 because it is more functional, safer, and will
have less impact. If the house is built on the bottom of the Lot, grading will be necessary
due to sandy, gravely [sic] soil. Retaining walls will also be necessary. It appears that
building on top will not have these problems. There will be no impact on adjacent property.
The house fits in and blends into the hillside." Council Minutes, 11 8.3 at p.6, Exhibit "D."
18.

Petitioners presented further evidence that a home on the upper end of the

Lot would be in substantial compliance with the 30% slope requirement.

Richard L.

Maires, a licensed engineer, stated:
The slope - this is in front of the house - from the street down to the rront
of the building will be 26%. The slope of the south side will be 32%, the
slope on the north side will be 30%. These virtually fit in with your Hillside
Ordinance.
Council Tr. at 3, Exhibit "C."
19.

Counsel for Petitioners raised the issue of equitable estoppel and stated that

views of the neighbors were not a proper consideration under the Hillside Zoning
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Ordinance. Council Tr. at 4-5, Exhibit "C"; Council Minutes, 11 8.4 at p.6, Exhibit "D."
Moreover, counsel pointed out that Draper would be violating the spirit of the Hillside
Zoning Ordinance because construction had already started on the upper end of the Lot,
and the Lot could not be returned to its original condition. Id.
20.

The City Council upheld the decision of the Planning Commission by a vote

of 3 to 0. Petition at 11 15; Answer at U 2. The stated reason for the vote "is that this would
be setting a precedence [sic] and if we go against the Hillside Ordinance we will have a lot
of problems." Council Minutes, 11 8.7 at p.7, Exhibit "D."
21.

On August 24, 1994, counsel for Petitioners wrote a letter to Draper City

stating that the appeal of the decision of the Planning Commission should have been heard
by the Board of Adjustment, not the City Council. The August 24, 1994 letter further
requested the Petitioners' appeal be properly lodged and heard by the Draper City Board
of Adjustment. Petition at II 16; Answer at 11 2. A copy of this August 24, 1994 letter is
attached hereto as Exhibit "E."
22.

In an August 29, 1994 letter, counsel for Draper denied Petitioners' request

to have the appeal heard by the Board of Adjustment. A copy of this August 29, 1994 is
attached hereto as Exhibit "F."
23.

Draper has admitted that Petitioners have exhausted their administrative

remedies. Petition at 11 22; Answer at 11 2.
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ARGUMENT
I.

DRAPER CITY'S DECISION TO UPHOLD THE STOP WORK ORDER WAS
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS,
In reviewing Draper City's decision, this Court applies the "arbitrary and capricious"

standard. Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied,
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). If the decision is not supported by substantial evidence, or is
based on improper criteria, the court will invalidate the decision by the zoning authority.
E.g.. Navlor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 398 P.2d 27,28-29 (1965). A decision is arbitrary when
the reasons for the decision "are without factual basis" or consist of "vague reservations."
Davis County. 765 P.2d at 711.
In this case, Draper City's decision was arbitrary and capricious for several reasons.
First, Draper City's own experts -- its City Engineer, Building Official, and others - all
agreed that placement of the home on the upper end of the Lot better served the purposes
of the Hillside Zoning Ordinance. No contrary evidence was offered. Thus, the Draper
City Council's decision was not supported by "substantial evidence" and was "without factual
basis."
Second, the City Council's decision was not made on the merits, but was based on
an improper factor not provided for in the Hillside Zoning Ordinance-the neighbors'
concerns about possibly obstructed views. Utah law is clear that a City may not base its
decision on an improper factor not provided for in the zoning ordinance. As the Utah

(5632-1\ie«o.sa)

^

6\

Supreme Court stated, "the consent of neighboring landowners may not be made a criterion.
. . ." Thurston v. Cache County, 676 P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1981). Because nobody presented
any substantial evidence that placement of the home on the upper end of the Lot would
harm the hillside and the only objection was neighbors' concerns about potentially
obstructed views, it is clear that the City Council based its decision on this improper factor.
Third, the stated reason that "this would be setting a precedence [sic] and if we go
against the Hillside Ordinance we will have a lot of problems," (Council Minutes, 11 8.7 at
p.7) is not a legally sufficient finding by the City Council. None of the alleged "problems"
were articulated by the City Council.

Utah law is clear that "vague reservations"

unsupported by fact will not support administrative action. Davis County, 756 P.2d at 711.
In short, the reasons for Draper's decision fly in the face of Draper's own expert's
opinion on the application of the Hillside Zoning Ordinance. Moreover, the "vague
reservations expressed by either the single family owners or the [council] members"
demonstrate that the decision was "arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 711.
II.

DRAPER CITY IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM ISSUING THE STOP WORK
ORDER.
This is not the type of case where a zoning violator "acted in bad faith, fraudulently

or with knowledge." Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1038
(Utah 1984). Rather, Petitioners complied with every requirement that Draper City officials
told them was necessary before purchasing the Lot and commencing construction.
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Petitioners came to the City, took the City Engineer to the site, and after receiving a letter
stating that the letter does not waive compliance with zoning ordinances, sought and
obtained zoning approval and a Building Permit from the City. In reliance on receiving
zoning approval, issuance of the Building Permit, and Draper City's assurances that they had
complied with all requirements, Petitioners purchased the Lot and commenced construction,
incurring substantial expenses.
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that in situations such as this, the City is
equitably estopped from issuing a Stop Work Order:
To invoke the doctrine the [city] must have committed an act or omission
upon which the developer could rely in good faith in making substantial
changes in position or incurring extensive expenses. The action upon which
the developer claims reliance must be of a clear, definite and affirmative
nature. If the claim be based on an omission of the local zoning authority,
omission means a negligent or culpable omission where the party failing to act
was under a duty to do so. Silence or inaction will not operate to work an
estoppel. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the landowner has a duty to
inquire and confer with the local zoning authority regarding the uses of the
property that would be permitted.
Utah County v. Young. 615 P.2d 1265, 1267-68 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted).
In this case, Petitioners "inquire[d] and conferred] with local zoning authorities" and
made "substantial changes in position" and "incur[red] extensive expenses" in "good faith"
reliance on Draper's approval and issuance of the Building Permit. Id. Draper's actions
were "clear, definite and affirmative." Town of Alta v. Ben Home Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 803
(Utah App. 1992). Draper is equitably estopped from issuing the Stop Work Order.
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III.

DRAPER CITY'S ORDINANCE AND PRACTICE REQUIRING APPEALS OF
PLANNING COMMISSION DECISIONS TO THE CITY COUNCIL VIOLATE
UTAH'S LAND USE ACT.
As set forth above, Petitioners appealed the Planning Commission's decision to the

Draper City Council at the direction of Draper Officials who relied upon Section 6-1-4 of
the Land Use and Development Regulations of Draper, Utah. Section 6-1-4A provides that
f,

[a]ny person shall have the right to appeal by decision rendered by the Planning

Commission to the City Council." Moreover, Petitioners attempted to appeal this matter
to the Board of Adjustment, but were denied the opportunity to do so.
Section 6-1-4A of the Land Use and Development Regulations of Draper, Utah and
Draper's practice of having appeals of Planning Commission decisions heard by the City
Council violate Utah's Land Use Act. Section 10-9-703(1) of the Land Use Act expressly
provides:
The board of adjustment shall hear and decide:
(a) appeals from zoning decisions applying the zoning
ordinance.
§ 10-9-703, Utah Code Ann. (1992) (emphasis added). This case clearly involves a zoning
decision applying the zoning ordinance.
In construing the predecessor to Section 10-9-703, the Utah Supreme Court made
clear that the Board of Adjustment is to be the "appellate body for any person aggrieved
by a zoning decision." Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1986).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should find that Draper acted arbitrarily
and capriciously and is equitably estopped in issuing the Stop Work Order. This Court
should also find that Draper's practice and ordinance of having zoning appeals heard by the
City Council violates the Act This Court should reverse Draper City's decision to uphold
the Stop Work Order, allowing Petitioners to resume construction of their home on the East
end of the Lot
DATED this D^

day of November, 1994.
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

By: ArT.ea^
Gregory D,
Attorneys
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR REVIEW OF DRAPER CITY'S
DECISION TO UPHOLD ISSUANCE OF STOP WORK ORDER, postage prepaid, this
->

day of November, 1994, to the following:
Michael Z. Hayes
Michael J. Mazuran
MAZURAN & HAYES. P.C
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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